Free will and Indian philosophy by Bronkhorst,  Johannes
ANTIQVORVM
PHILOSOPHIA
an international journal
6 · 2012
PISA · ROMA
FABRIZIO SERRA EDITORE
MMXII
Direzione scientifica
Prof. Giuseppe Cambiano
Scuola Normale Superiore, Piazza dei Cavalieri 7, i 56126 Pisa
*
Autorizzazione del Tribunale di Pisa n. 41 del 21/12/2007
Direttore responsabile: Fabrizio Serra
*
Sono rigorosamente vietati la riproduzione, la traduzione, l’adattamento,
anche parziale o per estratti, per qualsiasi uso e con qualsiasi mezzo effettuati,
compresi la copia fotostatica, il microfilm, la memorizzazione elettronica, ecc.,
senza la preventiva autorizzazione scritta della Fabrizio Serra editore®, Pisa · Roma.
Ogni abuso sarà perseguito a norma di legge.
*
Proprietà riservata · All rights reserved
© Copyright 2012 by Fabrizio Serra editore®, Pisa · Roma.
Fabrizio Serra editore incorporates the Imprints Accademia editoriale,
Edizioni dell’Ateneo, Fabrizio Serra editore, Giardini editori e stampatori in Pisa,
Gruppo editoriale internazionale and Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali.
www.libraweb.net
Stampato in Italia · Printed in Italy
issn 1973-5030
issn elettronico 1974-4501
Amministrazione e abbonamenti
Fabrizio Serra editore®
Casella postale n. 1, succursale n. 8, i 56123 Pisa,
tel. +39 050 542332, fax +39 050 574888, fse@libraweb.net
I prezzi ufficiali di abbonamento cartaceo e/o Online sono consultabili
presso il sito Internet della casa editrice www.libraweb.net
Print and/or Online official subscription rates are available
at Publisher’s web-site www.libraweb.net
I pagamenti possono essere effettuati tramite versamento su c.c.p. n. 17154550
o tramite carta di credito (American Express, CartaSi, Eurocard, Mastercard, Visa)
*
Uffici di Pisa: Via Santa Bibbiana 28, i 56127 Pisa, fse@libraweb.net
Uffici di Roma: Via Carlo Emanuele I 48, i 00185 Roma, fse.roma@libraweb.net
SOMMARIO
libertà e scelta
Anne Cheng, La ricezione del concetto di libertà in Cina                                                    11
Johannes Bronkhorst, Free Will and Indian Philosophy                                                 19
Carlo Natali, Un argomento aristotelico contro il determinismo                                       31
Karen Margrethe Nielsen, The Will: Origins of  the Notion in Aristotle’s Thought         47
discussioni e ricerche
Francesco Fronterotta, I fiumi, le acque, il divenire. Su Eraclito, frr. 12, 49A, 91
DK [40, 40c2, 40c3 Marcovich]                                                                                              71
Maria Isabella Bertagna, Sulla costruzione del racconto nel Protagora di Platone         91
Massimiliano Carloni, Una parafrasi di Omero nella Repubblica di Platone              101
Vincenzo Damiani, Nota testuale a Epicuro, ad pyth., 101                                             129
David Machek, The Ideal of  Quiescent Mind: «Mind» and «Vital Energy» in China
of  the Fourth Century b.C.                                                                                                 135
Norme redazionali della Casa editrice                                                                              159

FREE WILL AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
Johannes Bronkhorst
he Oxford Handbook of  Free Will observes, with regard to Western philosophy, that
the problem of  free will and necessity (or determinism) is «perhaps the most volu-
minously debated of  all philosophical problems».1 This should not surprise us. This ab-
struse philosophical problem is directly related to a conviction that most of  us in the
modern world share, and that was well formulated by William James:
the whole feeling of  reality, the whole sting and excitement of  our voluntary life, depends on
our sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to another, and that it is not
the dull rattling off of  a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago.2
Many people feel that there is a contradiction between this conviction and one of  the
tasks which science sets out to address, viz., finding the rules that govern «the rattling
off of  a chain forged innumerable ages ago».
This is not the place to review the different ways in which modern scholars, scientists
and philosophers try to solve the problem.3 James himself  was inclined to a spiritual
 solution. Others have tried to capitalize on the presumed discovery that nature itself  in
its fundamental functioning does not seem to be governed deterministically.4 Others
again have argued that the almost infinite complexity of  processes in the human brain
offers us something as good as free will, even if  it is not quite the real thing.5
Many psychologists do not waste time on this question. They may be willing to grant
that we have the feeling of  conscious will, and may try to explain why. They are not will-
ing to assign a causal role to this feeling in the mechanism that governs our behavior.
They present a variety of  arguments and experimental findings to prove The Illusion of
Conscious Will.
Johannes Bronkhorst, Université de Lausanne, Lausanne; johannes.bronkhorst@ unil.ch
This article is indebted to two earlier publications of  mine: (i) Appendix ii.3 (Psychology and free will) of  my
 Absorption: Two Studies of  Human Nature (Bronkhorst 2012); (ii) Chapter §4 (Vai®esika and Nyaya  psychology) of
my Karma and Teleology: A problem and its solutions in Indian philosophy (Bronkhorst 2000, pp. 17-21). Thanks are
further due to Elisa Freschi.
1 Kane 2002, p. 3, citing Matson 1987, i, p. 158. Dennett (1984, p. 2), commenting on this claim, states: «Any
philosopher ought to feel at least a little embarrassed that with so much work so little progress has been made».
2 James 1890, i, p. 453.
3 The Oxford Handbook of  Free Will (Kane 2002), already mentioned, provides a useful presentation of  the main
positions. See also Fischer et al. 2007.
4 This remains far from certain. Almost a century after its creation, the indeterministic nature of  quantum
physics is regularly challenged. See the review articles in «New Scientist» of  22 March 2008 and 28 March 2009,
and the cover story of  30 April 2011 («End of  uncertainty: Goodbye Heisenberg. Hello quantum certainty?»).
 Another difficulty with this approach is how undetermined, i.e. random, processes can be supposed to account
for free will.
5 See, e.g., Dennett 2003, p. 225: «I claim that the varieties of  free will I am defending are worth wanting
 precisely because they play all the valuable roles free will has been traditionally invoked to play. But I cannot deny
that the tradition also assigns properties to free will that my varieties lack. So much the worse for tradition, say
I». The Varieties of  Free Will Worth Wanting is the subtitle of  an earlier book by Dennett (1984).
T
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This, incidentally, is the title of  a book by the psychologist Daniel M. Wegner (2002).
It will be useful to consider the position he puts forward. Conscious will, he points out
(p. 67),
is not a direct perception of  [the] relation [between thought and action] but rather a feeling based
on the causal inference one makes about the data that do become available to consciousness –
the thought and the observed act.
The experience of  will … is the way our minds portray their operations to us, not their actual op-
eration. Because we have thoughts of  what we will do, we can develop causal theories relating
those thoughts to our actions on the basis of  priority, consistency, and exclusivity. We come to
think of  these prior thoughts as intentions, and we develop the sense that the intentions have
causal force even though they are actually just previews of  what we may do. (p. 96).
It follows, Wegner thinks, that conscious will is an epiphenomenon: «Just as compass read-
ings do not steer the boat, conscious experiences of  will do not cause human actions»
(p. 318).
James’s conviction that things are really being decided by us from one moment to an-
other will find little comfort in Wegner’s position. He thought that this conviction is in-
compatible with the other one according to which reality is «the dull rattling off of  a
chain that was forged innumerable ages ago». Wegner, too, thinks that these two are in-
compatible. In reality they are not. For Wegner, the real action takes place in the brain,
or in the unconscious mind. There is there no place for conscious will. Seen this way,
this is a mere epiphenomenon with no causal role to play. However, Wegner’s conclu-
sion is the outcome of  his prior decision as to what psychology is all about. The decision
that the real action is confined to the brain, or to processes that remain below the sur-
face, cannot but exclude conscious activities from the causal chain. It follows from such
an a priori decision that all the decisions we take, including difficult ones which require
much thought (as opposed to the lifting of  a finger which figures so prominently in
Wegner’s experiments), are no real decisions at all.
Wegner’s position has to face some serious difficulties. If, as he claims, conscious will
is an illusion, an epiphenomenon that plays no role in determining our behavior, then
the elements that go into the making of  conscious will, ultimately pleasure and pain,
play no such role either. This raises the question why evolution has provided us with
those experiences to begin with. The obvious answer – viz. that pursuing pleasure and
avoiding pain bring evolutionary rewards – is impossible to maintain if  those experi-
ences cannot even in principle influence behavior.1
If, unlike Wegner and so many other modern thinkers, we opt for a psychology which
includes experiential elements, James’s incompatibility disappears. In that case, our de-
cisions can have a causal effect, for the simple reason that our decisions are part of  the
causal chains which our psychology seeks to uncover. This choice does not introduce in-
determinism, to be sure. The causal chains of  this new psychology can be as determin-
istic as any. ‘Free’ choices are determined by prior events, whatever their precise nature.
1 Compare the opening sentence of  Jeremy Bentham’s Introduction to the Principles of  Morals and Legislation:
«Nature has placed mankind under the governance of  two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone
to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do». (cited Kahneman 2011, p. 377) Note
further that pleasure and pain are «multiply realizable»: «They can … be embodied in highly diverse kinds of  phys-
ical-chemical processes and substrates». (Deacon 2012, p. 29)
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Yet the main demand of  those who insist on the acceptance of  conscious will, their con-
viction that their decisions are ‘real’ and have causal efficacy, is now fulfilled. As some re-
cent researchers have correctly pointed out: «determinism does not imply that our de-
liberations and conscious purposes are causally irrelevant to what we do».1 The difficult
and painful decisions we sometimes have to make are not just the feelings that accom-
pany processes that are beyond our ken and control. On the contrary, these decisions are
the way in which a process that may be fundamentally deterministic unfolds.2
Introducing experiential notions into psychology as functional elements (rather than
as accompanying epiphenomena) means abandoning (at least for the time being) the at-
tempt to explain human behavior exclusively in terms of  ultimately physical and chem-
ical processes. This is a step other sciences have taken before, so it should not count as
an obstacle.3 Evolutionary biology, to take an example, does not and cannot provide the
insights we expect from it if  it refuses to think of  phenotypes as opposed to genotypes.4
A full account of  the molecular processes in organisms is unlikely to clarify why certain
species survive and others don’t. The biologist has to think simultaneously on different
levels if  progress is to be made in his field.
A different yet comparable situation may prevail in the study of  human psychology.
If  we wish to make headway, we have to find place for conscious experiences, not as by-
products, but as functional elements of  the theory to be constructed.5 This is not quite
as radical as it may seem at first sight. Goal-directed activity, requiring cognitive maps
and goal-seeking, is known from living organisms of  all levels of  complexity.6 The ques-
1 Nahmias, Coates & Kvaran 2007, p. 220.
2 Similar remarks could be made about intellectual effort. To cite Mary Midgley: «When Einstein has just
solved a difficult problem, his reasoning cannot be explained by giving even the most accurate account of  the ac-
tions of  his neurons. To suggest that their actions were its real cause would mean that they did the work on their
own and told him about it afterwards. Anyone who has tried leaving such work to their neurons will agree that
this story is improbable». (letter to «New Scientist», 3 January 2009)
3 An extensive literature has developed around the question of  different levels of  explanation, and the related
issue of  reductionism; see e.g. McCauley 2007; Looren de Jong 2002; Hofstadter 2007, 37 ff. An important
concept here is ‘emergence’ – the notion that important kinds of  organization may emerge in systems of  many
interacting parts, but not follow in any way from the properties of  those parts. See the various contributions in
Clayton & Davies 2006. For a sophisticated attempt to explain mind from matter, see Deacon 2012.
4 «Because the genotype is asymmetrically dependent on the phenotype with respect to natural selection …,
it is the phenotype that offers the best causal explanation of  reproductive success … . The phenotypic level has a
causal efficacy and explanatory legitimacy of  its own, even if  the phenotype is determined by the genotype
(among other things). Identifying phenotypic traits is not a merely heuristic, free-for-all, essentially void kind of
explanation, but rather, it taps real causal factors in an organism’s chances of  survival». (Schouten & Looren
de Jong 2004, p. 312).
5 Philosophers will be inclined to invoke the help of  emergence; see note 3, above. «Materialist theories of  mind
… seek to do justice to two compelling but apparently incompatible scruples. One is that ours is a physical world,
everything happening within it open to physical explanation. The other is that mindedness is a matter of  causal sig-
nificance, that it makes a causal difference that there are minds. The more we feel the pull of  one of  these scruples,
the more mysterious becomes the other. A robust commitment to physicalism leaves the mind looking like an
epiphenomenal by-product of  natural processes, a causally inert shadow. But a view of  the mind as possessing ae-
tiological autonomy threatens to re-enchant the physical world with supernatural causes and effects. The attrac-
tion of  emergentism is that it offers a way to escape the dilemma. An emergentist tries to prise free the soundly
motivated scruples about the dependence and autonomy of  the mental from too-rigid theory, to see the problems
as symptoms of  the fact that an insight has been poorly encoded in doctrine». (Ganeri 2011, pp. 696-697).
6 Some quotations from thinkers in this field illustrate this: Rose 2003, pp. 177-178: «despite its popularity with
psychological theorists, modellers and neurobiological experimenters, association cannot be the only way in which
memory occurs … For instance, on Skinner’s theory, rats ought to learn to run a maze correctly by learning each
correct turn (first left, second right and so on) individually and sequentially as a chain of  stimuli and responses. But
it was quite straightforward to show, by rearranging the maze or altering the cues within it, that the animals are
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tion how such cognitive maps and goal-seeking are to be explained without introducing
homunculi (little human beings inside human beings used to explain the latters’ behav-
ior) is complex. Dennett (2005, pp. 137, also 161) suggested:
As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose,
the nesting of  homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents
so unimpressive that they can be replaced by machines.
This, however, will not do. Deacon (2012, pp. 83-84) rightly comments:
everything [in Dennett’s suggestion] depends on mental processes being a cumulative effect of
the interactions of  tiny mindless robots. Though the homunculus problem is in this way subdi-
vided and distributed, it is not clear that the reduction of  complex intentionality to many tiny
intentions has done any more than give the impression that it can be simplified and simplified
until it just disappears. But it is not clear where this vanishing point will occur. Though intuitively
one can imagine simpler and simpler agents with stupider and stupider intentional capacities, at
what point does it stop being intentional and just become mechanism?
And on p. 139 he states: «No fractionation … into modules of  even smaller scope and
proportion allows the apparent arrow of  causality to reverse». Much of  the remainder
of  Deacon’s book is a sophisticated attempt to show that this arrow of  causality can ac-
tually reverse, and how.
This is not the occasion to enter into the details of  this fundamental discussion. It
should however be clear that much is gained by including experiential notions as func-
tional terms into psychology. This is indeed the position here taken. One of  its imme-
diate rewards, as we have seen, is that the so-called problem of  Free Will loses its fangs.
More precisely put, once the causal role that conscious will can play is acknowledged,
the so-called problem of  free will is no more than an abstruse philosophical problem
that, even if  it could be given a precise formulation (which I doubt), will no longer de-
serve the attention it receives from specialists and lay people alike.
The preceding reflections may be read as an argument in favor of  a psychology that in-
cludes experiential notions as functional elements. There may be a need for that in mod-
ern science, but that is not the point to be made here. I will rather argue in what follows
not so inefficient; instead they seem after a few trials to be able to form some sort of  a global image of  the maze, a map
if  you like, in their brains, so that wherever they are placed in it they can deduce where the goal may be and adopt
the most efficient route towards it without being excessively confused by the rearrangement of  the maze. Animals
use strategies when they learn; they can create concepts. To understand such mechanisms it is not adequate to re-
duce them to linear sequences of  stimulus-response, positive and negative reinforcement». (my emphasis, JB). Also
p. 269: «Cognitive behaviour is not reducible to simple sequences of  contingencies of  reinforcement but instead re-
flects goal-seeking activities, hypothesis making and many other features which had hitherto been dismissed from
consideration within the Anglo-American tradition in psychology». Rose 2005, p. 22: «[A] free-living cell … needs
to be able to respond appropriately to … changes. One way of  conceiving of  this capacity to vary a program is as
an action plan, an ‘internal representation’ of  the desired goal – at its minimum, that of  survival at least until repli-
cation is achieved». Intelligence in cells is also defended in Ford 2009. See further Kandel 2005, p. 118: «investiga-
tions which fail to consider internal representations of  mental events are inadequate to account for behavior, not
only in humans but – perhaps more surprisingly – also in simple experimental animals». Freeman 1999, pp. 120-121:
«the ingredients received by brains from their sensory cortices with which to make meanings are produced by the
cortices. They are not direct transcriptions or impressions from the environment inside or outside the body. All
that brains can know has been synthesized within themselves, in the form of  hypotheses about the world and the
outcomes of  their own tests of  the hypotheses, success or failure, and the manner of  failure».
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that such psychological theories are not unknown in classical India. I will first concen-
trate on the aspect of  Vai®esika philosophy (and of  the Nyaya philosophy that is strong-
ly influenced by Vai®esika) that deals with human behavior.
Vai®esika has seriously tried to explain human behavior in non-teleological terms. In
this system, the soul is conceived of  as a motionless substance. Like other substances,
it can have qualities. Many of  the qualities that can inhere in certain other substances,
however, – such as color, or smell, and so on – cannot inhere in the soul. And many of
the qualities that can inhere in the soul cannot inhere in those other substances.
The list of  qualities that can only inhere in the soul are together responsible for
Vai®esika psychology.1 As enumerated in the Padarthadharmasamgraha, alias Pra®asta -
padabhasya, they are: knowledge (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), desire (iccha),
aversion (dvesa), effort (prayatna), virtue (dharma), sin (adharma), subliminal impres-
sions (samskara).2 The order of  this enumeration is not arbitrary. Knowledge of  an
 object – usually perception – precedes the experience of  pleasure or pain connected
with that object; this in its turn gives rise to desire and aversion respectively; next in line
follows effort that seeks to obtain or avoid that object; as a result virtue and sin come
into being, as well as subliminal impressions.
If  for the moment we leave aside the issue of  virtue and sin, we see that the Vai®esika
scheme has a behaviorist flavor to it: behavior that leads to good experiences is repeated,
behavior that leads to bad experiences is henceforth avoided. But unlike behaviorism,
Vai®esika does not avoid experiential terms – most notably «knowledge», «pleasure»,
«pain», «desire», and «aversion» – which have a place in the fundamental scheme.
Consider the following nutshell description of  psychology in the Nyaya Bhasya, a text
that follows the Vai®esika scheme:3
A [soul] which, being conscious, recognizes that pleasure can be produced through a [certain]
means and which, desiring to obtain that [pleasure], makes an effort to obtain the means, will
be connected with pleasure, not [a soul] which is the opposite [of  this]. And a [soul] which rec-
ognizes that pain can be produced through a [a certain] means and which, desiring to avoid that
[pain], makes an effort to give up the means, will be abandoned by pain, not [a soul] which is the
opposite [of  this].
Elsewhere the same text adds some details:4
From … incorrect knowledge result attraction (raga) towards agreeable things, and aversion
(dvesa) towards disagreeable things. Under the influence of  attraction and aversion, faults (dosa)
such as untruth, jealousy, deceit and greed come into being. Prompted by [these] faults [a per-
son], while acting with his body, practices violence, theft and forbidden forms of  sexual inter-
course; [while acting] with his voice [he engages in] lying, abusive speech, slander and incoherent
[speech]; [while acting] with his mind [he engages in] plotting against others, craving other peo-
1 See Bronkhorst 1993, pp. 62. 2 See WI, p. 16 §80.
3 NBh, p. 917 l. 9-11 (on NS 3.2.72): yah khalu cetanavan sadhananirvartaniyam sukham buddhva tad ipsan
 sadhanavaptaye prayatate sa sukhena yujyate na viparitah / ya® ca sadhananirvartaniyam duhkham buddhva taj jihasuh
sadhanaparivarjanaya yatate sa ca duhkhena tyajyate na viparitah/.
4 NBh, p. 76 l. 10-15 (on NS 1.1.2): etasman mithyajñanad anukulesu ragah, pratikulesu dvesah / ragadvesadhikarac
casatyersyamayalobhadayo dosa bhavanti / dosaih prayuktah ®arirena pravartamano himsasteyapratisiddhamaithunany
acarati, vaca ‘nrtaparusasucanasambaddhani, manasa paradroham paradravyabhipsam nastikyam ceti / seyam papatmika
pravrttir adharmaya / atha ®ubha: ®arirena danam paritranam paricaranam ca, vaca satyam hitam priyam svadhyayam
ceti, manasa dayam asprham ®raddham ceti / seyam dharmaya/.
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ple’s property and apostasy. This sinful activity gives rise to sin (adharma). As to pure [activity]:
with his body [he practices] liberality, protecting [others] and serving them; with his voice [he
speaks] what is true, beneficial and agreeable, and [he does] his Vedic recitation; with his mind
[he practices] compassion, non-desiring and trust. It gives rise to virtue (dharma).
The very presence of  a desire proves that there must have been an agreeable experience
preceding it. This argument is used in the Nyaya Sutra and Bhasya to establish that the
soul is eternal, or more precisely, that the soul existed before its present birth, for a new-
born being desires the breast of  its mother:1
The soul is also eternal for the following reason: Because of  the desire for maternal milk in the case
of  a person who has died [and is reborn]2 which has been brought about by the repeated experience of  being
fed [in this way] (ns 3.1.21). A desire for maternal milk, characterized by activity, is observed in the
case of  a just born living being. This is not [possible] without the repeated experience of  being
fed. Why? Since it is seen that embodied beings that are suffering from hunger develop a desire
to be fed as a result of  the series of  memories created by the repeated experience of  being fed.
This [desire] is not possible in the case of  a just born being without the repeated experience [of
being fed] in an earlier body. An earlier body is therefore inferred, in which this [just born living
being] repeatedly experienced being fed.
For our reflections it is crucial that the scheme underlying these passages uses experi-
ential terms. These experiential terms refer to mental states that are part of  the mech-
anism that underlies human behavior. Like all attempts at scientific explanation, deter-
minism is more or less presupposed. It is, at any rate, not an issue in the Indian texts
concerned. More precisely, the question of  free will is not an issue, because there is no
place for a felt contradiction between decisions and the mechanism that makes humans
act; there is no place for such a contradiction because human mental activity plays a cru-
cial role in the process. Determinism, seen this way, takes nothing away from the free-
dom to act in accordance with one’s feelings, because these feelings are themselves part
of  the mechanism described.
Nyaya-Vai®esika psychology, then, is the kind of  psychology in which the conflict be-
tween conscious will and determinism does not arise, because even if  we think of  it in
deterministic terms, this does not deprive humans of  the possibility to act in accordance
with their will. To repeat it once more: free will is not an issue in Nyaya-Vai®esika be-
cause its psychology uses experiential terms among its fundamental notions.
Should we conclude from what precedes that Indian thinkers were immune to the issue
of  free will and determinism? I do not think so. In systems of  thought that postulated
that other, ‘deeper’, forces than the human will determine one’s actions, the conflict be-
tween the two was acutely felt. An example is provided by the Ajivikas, a religion that
vanished from India without leaving us any texts, but about which we know enough to
assert with confidence that it adhered to a thorough-going determinism.3 Most impor-
1 NBh, p. 745 l. 6 - p. 746 l. 2 (on NS 3.1.21): ita® ca nitya atma: pretyaharabhyasakrtat stanyabhilasat (NS 3.1.21) / jata-
matrasya vatsasya pravrttilingah stanyabhilaso grhyate / sa ca nantarenaharabhyasam / kaya yuktya? dr®yate hi ®aririnam
ksudha pidyamananam aharabhyasakrtat smarananubandhad aharabhilasah / na ca purva®arirabhyasam antarenasau
jatamatrasyopapadyate / tenanumiyate bhutapurvam ®ariram yatranenaharo ‘bhyasta iti/. Preisendanz (1994, 365 f., n.
100) refers to other texts, also outside the Nyaya tradition, that use this argument.
2 On the difficulty of  interpreting pretya here, see Preisendanz 1994, 369 f.
3 See Bronkhorst 2003. It is possible that determinism also characterized early Jainism; Bronkhorst 2000a.
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tantly, this determinism did not involve the human will. One of  its fundamental beliefs
was that all living beings have to pass through an astronomical number of  lives spread
over 8,400,000 great world periods (maha-kalpa), at the end of  which they will all of
them, ‘fool and wise’, be liberated. In this process the human (or animal) will is power-
less against the forces that are responsible for the fate of  living beings. The result is fa-
talism, the conviction that our will is not free. An Ajivika alive today (unfortunately
there are none) might say that the experience of  free will is an epiphenomenon.
Fatalism is also known to the Sanskrit epic called Mahabharata. It is referred to as
Kalavada (‘doctrine of  Time’).1 It is here sometimes presented as being altogether dif-
ferent from the doctrine of  karmic retribution:2 «One does not get anything through
his deeds». Other passages show that no such opposition was felt:3 «Realize that Time
has deeds for its bodily form (karmamurtyatmaka) – it is witness to deeds good and
bad, and it yields its fruit later in Time, giving rise to pleasant and unpleasant things».
And again:4 «The universe is driven by action that is yoked to Time (kalayukta)».
Whether ultimately caused by deeds or otherwise, Kala determines one’s fate in a
way that is inescapable. The Ajivikas used the term Niyati (‘destiny, fate’) to empha-
size the fatalistic aspect of  their doctrine. The existence of  Niyati does not deny the
role of  deeds; quite on the contrary, it describes how karmic retribution works ac-
cording to the adherents of  this school of  thought. Kala plays a similar role in the
Mahabharata: it may simply sum up the workings of  deeds in the opinion of  those
who think that karmic retribution follows a fixed pattern from which there is no es-
cape for the individual.
More important, and interesting, for our purposes is the Carvaka school of  philoso-
phy. This school explicitly opted for a materialist vision of  the world, and claimed in its
foundational text – the Carvaka- or Barhaspatya-sutra – that consciousness is derived
from the four material elements. The relevant sutras read (Bhattacharya 2002, pp.
603-604):
i.2: prthivy apas tejo vayur iti tattvani
i.3: tatsamudaye ®arirendriyavisayasamjñah
i.4: tebhya® caitanyam
This may be translated as follows:
i.2: Earth, water, fire and air are the principles, nothing else.
i.3: Their combination is called ‘body’, ‘sense’ and ‘object’.
i.4: Consciousness [arises] out of  these.
It seems clear from this that mental states play no role in the activity of  living beings,
and this appears to have been the conviction of  the author of  this text and of  most of
his followers. But not of  all of  them.
The materialistic position of  the Carvaka-sutra does not leave place for mental phe-
nomena except as epiphenomena. At least one commentator on this text, Udbhata,5
was not happy about this, and made an effort to find an interpretation that allows them
1 See Scheftelowitz 1929; Vassilkov 1999; further Hill 2001, 195 ff.; González-Reimann 2002, pp. 20-50;
Bronkhorst 2007, 105 f.; Malinar 2010. 2 Mhbh, 12.26.5a: na karmana labhyate.
3 Mhbh, 12.34.7; tr. Fitzgerald 2004, p. 243. 4 Mhbh, 12.34.10cd.
5 Udbhata was both a Carvaka and a grammarian; Bronkhorst 2008.
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a more active role. He did so by proposing a different interpretation to a number of  su-
tras, most notably the numbers i.2 and i.4 considered above. In sutra i.2 he took iti not
to indicate that the enumeration is complete (‘nothing else’), but rather the opposite,
viz., that there are further elementary principles, which he then enumerated:1
yad acasta bhattodbhatah: “iti®abdah pradar®anaparo na punah samaptivacana® caitanya®abda-
sukhaduhkhecchadvesaprayatnasamskaranam tattvantaratvat …”
Bhattacharya (2002, p. 615) translates (modified):
As said Bhatta Udbhata, “The word iti does not denote the end [but] is illustrative. There are oth-
er principles, viz. consciousness, sound, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, subliminal im-
pressions. …”
It is clear from this quotation that Udbhata adds mental phenomena (consciousness,
pleasure, pain, desire, aversion) to the list of  elementary principles, and therefore as
functional elements. The added elements, be it noted, correspond almost term by term
to the qualities that can only inhere in the soul according to Pra®astapada, studied
above.
Scholars have wondered whether Udbhata’s addition of  Vai®esika qualities to the Car-
vaka list of  elementary principles is due to a special link that Udbhata may have had
with the Vai®esika (or Nyaya) school of  thought.2 We do not have to address this ques-
tion here. For our present enquiry it suffices to consider that Udbhata appears to have
felt the need to raise mental phenomena to something more than mere epiphenomena
resting on the material elements which alone are ultimately real.
This consideration is strengthened by Udbhata’s interpretation of  sutra i.4. We had
translated it as «Consciousness [arises] out of  these (i.e., out of  the four material prin-
ciples)», and this was most probably its intended meaning. Udbhata makes use of  an
ambiguity of  Sanskrit (tebhyah can be a dative as well as an ablative case) to propose a
different interpretation:3
udbhatena tu “bhutebhyah” iti padam caturthyantataya vyakhyatam, bhutebhya® caitanyam bhutar -
tham caitanyam svatantram eva ®arirarambhakabhutopakarakam ity arthah
Udbhata interprets the expression “from the elements” (i.e. “out of  these” in sutra i.4) as being
in the dative, meaning consciousness is to or for the elements;4 [he says that] consciousness is au-
tonomous and is an assistant to the material elements which constitute the body.
Philosophically the proposal to allow mental elements to play an assisting role, beside
material elements, is not free from difficulty; this has been shown by Ganeri in a recent
article (2011). However, we are at this moment not so much interested in the philosoph-
1 Passage quoted from Vadidevasuri’s Syadvadaratnakara (edited by Motilal Ladhaji Osval, Delhi, Bhartiya
Book Corporation, 1988, p. 1087, l. 1-4) reproduced in Bhattacharya 2002, p. 607, Bha 16.
2 So, e.g., Bhattacharya 2010, p. 423 («Aviddhakarna and Udbhata were basically Naiyayikas. Even if  they
were converted to the Carvaka/Lokayata, they brought the whole baggage of  Nyaya-Vai®esika terminology when
they composed their commentaries on the Carvakasutra»).
3 Passage quoted from Cakradhara’s Granthibhanga (edited by Gaurinath Sastri, along with Jayantabhatta’s
Nyayamañjari, Varanasi, Sampurnanand Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, 1982-1984, pp. 257-258; edited by N. G. Shah,
Ahmedabad, 1972, p. 197) reproduced in Bhattacharya 2002, p. 606. Tr. Ganeri 2011, p. 689, modified.
4 Del Toso’s (2011, p. 52) interpretation of  bhutartha as «object/thing made by / based on elements» is not
 possible.
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ical possibility of  Udbhata’s position, but rather in the reason why he reinterpreted the
sutras considered the way he did.1
This reason, I suggest, is that Udbhata was not willing to put up with the fatalism im-
plicit in the strict materialism of  Carvaka thought. He was not willing to accept that de-
sire and other mental phenomena are mere epiphenomena. He saw that Nyaya-Vai®esi-
ka thought included a psychology in which there was a possibility for human wishes
and desires to play a role. Carvaka thought had no place for such a psychology. To
change that, Udbhata took from Nyaya-Vai®esika the elements he needed – essentially
experiential elements – and added them onto Carvaka ontology. In doing so, he created
a variety of  Carvaka philosophy in which there was place for ‘free will’.2 At the same
time he opened a philosophical hornet’s nest.
Bibliographical references
Basham A. L. 1951, History and Doctrines of  the Ajivikas. A Vanished Indian Religion. Reprint: Delhi,
Motilal Banarsidass, 1981.
Bhattacharya Ramkrishna 2002, Carvaka fragments: a new collection, «Journal of  Indian Philos-
ophy», 30 (6), 2002, pp. 597-640.
—, 2010, Commentators on the Carvakasutra: A critical survey, «Journal of  Indian Philosophy», 38 (4),
2010, pp. 419-430.
Bronkhorst Johannes 1993, The Two Traditions of  Meditation in Ancient India. Second revised
edition. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1993.
—, 2000, Karma and Teleology. A problem and its solutions in Indian philosophy, Tokyo, International
Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2000 («Studia Philologica, Monograph Series», xv).
—, 2000a, The riddle of  the Jainas and Ajivikas in early Buddhist literature, «Journal of  Indian Philos-
ophy», 28, 2000, pp. 511-529.
—, 2003, Ajivika doctrine reconsidered, in Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion, edited by Ed. Piotr
Balcerowicz, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 2003 («Lala Sundarlal Jain Research Series», 20), pp.
153-178.
—, 2007, Greater Magadha. Studies in the culture of  early India, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2007 («Hand-
book of  Oriental Studies», 2/19).
—, 2008, Udbhata, a grammarian and a Carvaka, in Linguistic Traditions of  Kashmir. Essays in mem-
ory of  pandit Dinanath Yaksha, edited by Mrinal Kaul and Ashok Aklujkar, New Delhi, D. K.
Printworld, 2008, pp. 281-299.
—, 2012, Absorption: Two Studies of  Human Nature, Rorschach, UniversityMedia, 2012.
Deacon Terrence W. 2012, Incomplete Nature: How mind emerged from matter, New York-Lon-
don, W. W. Norton, 2012.
Del Toso Krishna 2011, Is cognition an attribute of  the self  or it rather belongs to the body? Some
 dialectical considerations on Udbhatabhatta’s position against Nyaya and Vai®esika, «Open Journal
of  Philosophy», 1 (2), 2011, pp. 48-56.
1 Del Toso (2011, p. 50) suggests that «in order to give more internal consistence to his theories in the light of
the criticism put forward by the non-materialists, as was the case of  the objections … raised against Carvaka phi-
losophy by Vatsyayana … in his Nyayasutrabhasya …, it is not impossible that Udbhatabhatta tried to find new in-
terpretations of  some problematic Carvaka aphorism[s]». This is not the position here taken.
2 Most remarkably, Pakudha Kaccayana, one of  the six heretical teachers presented in the early Buddhist
canon, claims the existence of  seven elementary entities: the four elements (earth, water, fire and air), pleasure,
pain and life/soul (jiva); see Basham 1951, p. 16. That is to say, Pakudha adds to the four usual elements at least
two experiental terms. Was he inspired to do so by reflections about ‘free will’? (According to Pratchett 2000,
p. 14 there are five elements: earth, water, fire, air and surprise.)
28                                                 johannes bronkhorst
Dennett Daniel C. 1984, Elbow Room. The Varieties of  Free Will Worth Wanting, New York, Ox-
ford University Press, 1984.
—, 2003, Freedom Evolves, London, Allen Lane, 2003.
—, 2005, Sweet Dreams. Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of  Consciousness, Cambridge, Massachu-
setts & London, England, The Mit Press, 2005.
Fischer John Martin, Kane Robert, Pereboom Derk & Vargas Manuel 2007, Four Views
on Free Will, Malden, Ma, etc., Blackwell, 2007.
Ford Brian J. 2009, On intelligence in cells: the case for whole cell biology, «Interdisciplinary Science
Review», 34 (4), 2009, pp. 350-365.
Freeman Walter J. 1999, How Brains Make up their Minds, London, Phoenix, 2000.
Ganeri Jonardon 2011, Emergentisms, ancient and modern, «Mind», 120 (479, July 2011), pp. 671-
703.
González-Reimann Luis 2002, The Mahabharata and the Yugas. India’s great epic poem and the
Hindu system of  world ages, New York etc., Peter Lang, 2002 («Asian Thought and Culture», 51).
Halbfass Wilhelm 1994 Menschsein und Lebensziele. Beobachtungen zu den purusarthas, in
Hermeneutics of  Encounter. Essays in honour of  Gerhard Oberhammer on the occasion of  his
65th birthday, edited by Francis X. D’Sa and Roque Mesquita, Wien, Sammlung De Nobili,
1994.
Hill Peter 2001, Fate, Predestination and Human Action in the Mahabharata: A study in the history
of  ideas, New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal, 2001.
Hofstadter Douglas 2007, I Am A Strange Loop. New York, Basic Books, 2007.
James William 1890, The Principles of  Psychology. 2 vols. Reprint: New York, Dover Publications,
1950.
Kahneman Daniel 2011, Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.
Kandel Eric R. 2005, Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the New Biology of  Mind, Washington, dc &
London, England, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2005.
Kane Robert (ed.) 2002, The Oxford Handbook of  Free Will, Oxford etc., Oxford University Press,
2002.
Looren de Jong Huib 2002, Levels of  explanation in biological psychology, «Philosophical Psychol-
ogy», 15 (4), 2002, pp. 441-462.
Malinar Angelika 2010, Time and destiny, in Brill’s Encyclopedia of  Hinduism, vol. ii: Sacred Texts
and Languages, Ritual Traditions, Arts, Concepts, edited by Knut A. Jacobsen et al., Leiden-
Boston, Brill, 2010 («Handbook of  Oriental Studies», 2/22/2), pp. 870-876.
Matson Wallace 1987, A New History of  Philosophy, vol. i, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jo-
vanovich, 1987 (not seen).
McCauley Robert N. 2007, Reduction: models of  cross-scientific relations and their implications for
the psychology-neuroscience interface, in Philosophy of  Psychology and Cognitive Science, edited by
Paul Thagard, Amsterdam etc., Elsevier / North-Holland, 2007, pp. 105-158.
Nahmias Eddy, Coates D. Justin & Kvaran Trevor 2007, Free will, moral responsibility, and
mechanism: experiments on folk intuitions, «Midwest Studies in Philosophy», 31, 2007, pp. 214-242.
Nyaya Sutra. In: Nyayadar®anam with Vatsyayana’s Bhasya, Uddyotakara’s Varttika, Vacaspati
Mi®ra’s Tatparyatika & Vi®vanatha’s Vrtti. Chapter i, section i critically edited with notes by
Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and chapters i-ii-v by Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, with an in-
troduction by Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha. Reproduced by Rinsen Book Co., Kyoto, 1982.
Pratchett Terry 2000, The Truth, Corgi Books, 2001.
Preisendanz Karin 1994, Studien zu Nyayasutra iii.1 mit dem Nyayatattvaloka Vacaspati Mi®ras ii,
Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 2 vols., 1994 (ANISt, 46.1 and 46.2).
Rose Steven 2003, The Making of  Memory. From molecules to mind. Revised edition. London, Vin-
tage, 2003.
—, 2005, The 21st-Century Brain. Explaining, Mending and Manipulating the Mind, London, Vintage,
2006.
                                         free will and indian philosophy                                    29
Schouten Maurice K. D. & Looren de Jong Huib 2004, Could the neural ABC explain the
mind? «Behavioral and Brain Sciences», 27 (2), 2004, pp. 311-312.
Scheftelowitz J. 1929, Die Zeit als Schicksalsgottheit in der indischen und iranischen Religion,
Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1929.
Vassilkov Yaroslav 1999, Kalavada (the doctrine of  cyclical time) in the Mahabharata and the con-
cept of  heroic didactics, in Composing a Tradition: Concepts, Techniques and Relationships. Proceed-
ings of  the First Dubrovnik International Conference on the Sanskrit Epics and Puranas, Au-
gust 1997, edited by Mary Brockington and Peter Schreiner, Zagreb, Croation Academy of
Sciences and Arts, 1999, pp. 17-33.
Abbreviations
ANISt = Alt- und Neuindische Studien, Hamburg.
NBh = Nyaya Bhasya. For the edition see Nyaya Sutra.
NS = Nyaya Sutra.
NV = Nyaya Varttika of  Uddyotakara. For the edition, see Nyaya Sutra.
Vy = Vyomavati of  Vyoma®ivacarya, edited by Gaurinath Sastri, 2 vols., Varanasi, Sampurnanand
Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1983-1984 (M. M. ±ivakumara®astri-granthamala, 6.)
WI = Word Index to the Pra®astapadabhasya: A complete word index to the printed editions of  the
Pra®astapadabhasya, by Johannes Bronkhorst & Yves Ramseier, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass,
1994.

composto in carattere dante monotype dalla
fabrizio serra editore,  pisa ·  roma.
stampato e rilegato nella
tipografia di  agnano, agnano pisano (pisa) .
*
Dicembre 2012
(cz 2 · fg 21)

